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Situation in Mali

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2364 (2017), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2018 and requested me to report on a quarterly basis on its implementation, focusing on progress in taking forward the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (see S/2015/364 and S/2015/364/Add.1) and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it. The present report contains updates with regard to major developments in Mali since my previous report (S/2018/273) and recommendations for the renewal of the mandate of MINUSMA, taking into account the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review, led by Ellen Margrethe Løj, conducted in the first quarter of 2018.

II. Major political developments

2. During the period under review, the renewed momentum in the peace process brought about by the Prime Minister, Soumeylou Boubèye Maiga, and the recently established sanctions regime and the appointment of an independent observer, contributed to progress in the implementation of the Agreement. Discussion continued on the appointments of interim authorities at the district and municipality levels, and the mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu were established. The return of Malian armed forces to Kidal to join the mixed units is a significant step. Care must be taken to ensure that the momentum of the implementation of the road map is maintained throughout the campaigning period leading up to the presidential elections.

3. I was able to witness that progress during my visit to the country from 29 to 30 May. I was encouraged by the parties' determination to work together to advance the implementation of the Agreement, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, ahead of the presidential elections in July. However, given the challenges facing the country, including the expansion of violent extremist and criminal groups, it is critical that the international community unite in support of Mali and address the crisis through a multidimensional, coordinated response at the appropriate scale, which should include supporting Mali in the reconstitution of its armed forces, promoting development and strengthening resilience, as well as ensuring the Joint Force of the

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Group of Five for the Sahel is provided with sufficient resources to be an effective instrument in restoring stability in the Sahel.

A. Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

4. On 22 March, the signatory parties adopted a road map for the implementation of the timeline agreed at the session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee held on 16 January. The road map identifies priority actions to be undertaken in the short to medium term for the implementation of the Agreement and for the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of peaceful and credible presidential elections. It has led to the establishment of the mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu. The registration of combatants who are eligible for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is ongoing. The integration of combatants of armed groups into the Malian armed forces that was scheduled to commence on 25 April has been postponed to mid-June, with its completion anticipated by the end of August.

5. From 23 to 26 March, the Prime Minister travelled to Kidal, accompanied by my Special Representative for Mali, as well as to the Gao, Timbuktu and Mopti regions, to reaffirm the Government's commitment to improving security and access to basic social services. The visit was perceived as a positive step in the peace process.

6. On 23 April, the Agreement Monitoring Committee met in a regular session to assess progress in the implementation of the road map. Positive developments included the high-level workshop on security sector reform held from 27 to 29 March, the allocation of funding for the interim authorities for operations and capital investments for the year 2018 and the identification of personnel for deployment to command positions in the Operational Coordination Mechanism sites in Kidal and Timbuktu. The Committee noted that agreement in principle had been reached on the provision of equipment, including collective weapons, to the Mechanism sites in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Furthermore, during the reporting period, the pre-registration of combatants in preparation for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and for integration into the Malian defence and security forces continued, although the process was behind schedule.

7. On 28 May, the Agreement Monitoring Committee met to discuss the implementation of the Agreement, and noted, among other things, the positive progress made in the operationalization of the mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu. At the same meeting, the representatives of the independent observer presented its first report to the Committee, which covered the period from 15 January to 30 April. In the report, the independent observer called upon the parties to focus on the core tenets of the Agreement and recommended a clearer communication strategy and the greater inclusion of civil society.

8. On 30 May, I participated in a high-level meeting with the signatory parties, the Prime Minister of Mali, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria and mediation partners. All participants highlighted the recent progress made on the operationalization of the security and political provisions of the Agreement. I was encouraged by the interaction and the renewed commitment between the signatory parties.

State authority and institutional measures

9. The construction of offices for the Governor and for the interim authorities in Taoudenni, the capital of the Taoudenni region, began on 5 April. Four water points

funded through the Peacebuilding Fund, six schools and two youth centres were built during the reporting period in various districts in the region. In addition, as at 15 April, the Government provided the interim administrations in the five northern regions with $21.7 million for operations costs and capital investments and to implement key projects under their respective priority action plans.

10. The number of judicial and prison officials deployed to northern and central Mali remained unchanged during the reporting period. The deteriorating security situation resulted in 6.5 per cent of appointed officials remaining in a jurisdiction other than their appointed ones.

11. The number of State officials redeployed to the northern and central regions increased by 11 per cent during the reporting period. As at 30 May, only 33 per cent of State officials were present at their duty stations in the northern regions and in the Mopti region. The Governor of Taoudenni, sworn in on 9 April, continued to work from Timbuktu pending the construction of offices in Taoudenni. The governors of all the other northern regions remained deployed to their respective duty stations.

12. The United Nations supported the elaboration of integrated security plans for the prisons in Bamako and Koulikoro and, on 31 March, finalized a project to improve the security and conditions of detention for suspected terrorists and other high-risk detainees at the Bamako central prison. The Mission trained 97 prison officers, 3 of whom were women, in prison management in Bamako and Gao.

Political developments

13. Whereas the Government postponed the regional, district and municipal elections scheduled for April to 2019, during the reporting period, it also took several measures to prepare for the presidential elections. On 23 April, the President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, enacted the electoral law that had been amended, inter alia, to clarify voter identification requirements. On 27 April, the Council of Ministers set the 29 July as the date on which the electoral college would be convened. Also on 27 April, the electoral registry was declared satisfactory, following an audit by a committee composed of international and national experts, although the registry only included 27 per cent of citizens 18 to 23 years of age. On 29 April, 98 political parties, associations, public figures and activists launched a platform for political change, opposing the re-election of President Keita. As at 30 May, there are 22 candidates who have declared their candidature for the presidential elections, including the current President and Soumaila Cissé, the runner-up in the 2013 presidential election and leader of Union pour la République et la démocratie, the main opposition party.

14. The political opposition and civil society organizations criticized the Government for delays in conducting the reforms of the electoral system, claiming that their late implementation could have an adverse impact on the credibility of the elections. Opposition parties requested that the result of the elections be certified by the United Nations, however, because the certification of elections is not included in the mandate of MINUSMA, that request cannot be fulfilled. My Special Representative met with Malian officials and members of the political opposition, signatory armed groups and civil society to emphasize the importance of holding peaceful and inclusive elections within the time frame set in the Constitution. His good offices were also instrumental in facilitating the reform of the electoral law and MINUSMA will continue to provide support for the preparation of the elections, including technical, logistical and security support, within its existing resources and areas of deployment. However, the level of mistrust between the Government and opposition parties, which led to the organization of several demonstrations across Mali during the reporting period, constitutes a major source of concern ahead of the presidential election scheduled for 29 July.

15. On 3 April, the United Nations Development Programme established a new basket fund to support the electoral processes in Mali in 2018 and 2019. During the reporting period, MINUSMA provided electoral management bodies with technical, logistical, advisory and security support, including by introducing new electoral tools to strengthen the credibility and transparency of the electoral process.

16. The sustained advocacy efforts by MINUSMA and civil society notwithstanding, little progress was registered in ensuring the meaningful engagement of women in the peace process. Women's organizations continue to be supported by the Mission in designing strategies to increase the representation of women in the peace process and in reconciliation efforts in central Mali.

Defence and security measures and reforms

17. A high-level workshop on security sector reform, sponsored by MINUSMA, was held in Bamako from 27 to 29 March; the outcome of the workshop was a revised draft of the national security sector reform strategy, which will be presented to the National Council for Security Sector Reform for validation in the first week of June. The signatory parties continued discussions on integration quotas and on the configuration of the territorial police.

18. On 11 and 12 April, the Technical Commission on Security met in Bamako under the chairmanship of the MINUSMA Force Commander. The signatory parties committed to providing heavy weapons to one company in each of the Operational Coordination Mechanism bases in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Signatory armed groups provided the list of 51 combatants for the Mechanism site in Kidal on 23 April. Personnel and members of the command structure began deploying to the Kidal site on 7 May. On 24 May, the mixed units of the Mechanism in Timbuktu marked their official establishment in the presence of representatives of the interim authorities, regional civil and military authorities, armed groups, civil society and MINUSMA. As at 30 May, a total of 128 combatants were registered at the Kidal site, and 47 at the Timbuktu site.

19. The pre-registration of eligible combatants for the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and integration into the Malian defence and security forces, was due to be completed on 28 April. Signatory parties have requested a one-month extension to complete the process, however, owing to alleged logistical and security constraints.

20. During the reporting period, MINUSMA supported the implementation of the laws on military orientation and programming, internal security and the internal and democratic oversight of security institutions, through the provision of capacity-building, training, infrastructure rehabilitation, equipment and technical advice.

21. The Mission continued to coordinate operations with the Malian armed forces at the national and regional levels, in line with the memorandum of understanding between MINUSMA and the Government. It expanded coordinated activities throughout the central region, including patrols in Nampala and Léré and civil-military cooperation activities. The Mission also shared information with the Malian defence and security forces, within the limits of its mandate, for the protection of civilians and for the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel. The Mission continued to revise the memorandum of understanding to include operational and technical aspects of support, in addition to capacity-building.

B. Provision of support to the Malian defence and security forces

22. In cooperation with other international partners, MINUSMA continued to provide technical assistance for the Malian Specialized Judicial Unit against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime. On 23 March, the Mission signed an agreement with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to support jointly support the Specialized Judicial Unit through the provision of equipment and training.

23. During the reporting period, the Mission and partners trained 896 members of the Malian security forces, 45 of whom were women, from Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Bamako on various policing modules and on human rights, and 35 others, 12 of whom were women, from Timbuktu and Bamako on child protection.

24. On 30 March, the Mission completed a training course for 13 Malian military engineers in explosive ordnance disposal. The Mission also continued to mentor the national police improvised explosive device disposal team and rehabilitated four armouries in the Gao and Timbuktu regions.

C. Regional developments

25. MINUSMA continued planning its support to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and deployed logistics personnel to Joint Force headquarters in Sévaré to ensure closer coordination. The operationalization of the Joint Force had incurred some delays. Although States members of the Group of Five have designated their respective troops for the Joint Force, not all of them have been deployed, and the deadline for the Joint Force obtaining full operational capability has been postponed from March to a later date. On 3 May, the United Nations received the first tranche of funds from the European Union, providing for the Mission's support to the Joint Force in line with Security Council resolution 2391 (2017). Assessments of the six Joint Force camps on Malian territory in the central sector conducted by MINUSMA and the Group of Five are still ongoing, with a view to determining the level of engineering support required for the rehabilitation and fortification of these camps, and it should be noted that MINUSMA will need significant additional funding to carry out that construction work.

III. Major security developments

26. During the reporting period, the security situation remained of grave concern. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, in particular, continued to attack MINUSMA, the Malian defence and security forces and international forces across central and northern Mali, with the Mopti and Ségou regions affected the most. The group's attack on the MINUSMA and international forces camps in Timbuktu on 14 April demonstrated its ability to plan and execute increasingly complex operations. The precarious security situation was compounded by repeated clashes between the Dogon and Fulani communities in central Mali, as well as violent incidents mainly targeting Tuareg communities in the southern Ménaka region. The trend of the increasing use of improvised explosive devices in the Mopti region was confirmed at the beginning of the reporting period; such attacks having caused the death of an unprecedented number of civilians. Armed groups also continued to threaten local populations against cooperation with security forces.

A. Asymmetric and other attacks

27. During the reporting period, armed groups conducted 44 attacks: 18 against the Malian defence and security forces, 12 against MINUSMA, 3 against MINUSMA contractors, 8 against signatory armed groups, 1 against Operation Barkhane and 1 against both MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane. The highest number of attacks was carried out in Mopti (13), followed by Kidal (10), Gao (7), Timbuktu (5), Ségou (5) and Ménaka (4). The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims was very active in the Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu regions and claimed most of the asymmetric attacks conducted during the reporting period. During the reporting period, 4 peacekeepers were killed and 24 injured, whereas 4 peacekeepers were killed and 12 injured in the previous reporting period. Six MINUSMA contractors were killed, compared with one in the previous reporting period. Ten Operation Barkhane forces were injured, and two were reportedly killed and three injured in the previous reporting period.

28. Malian forces were heavily targeted, but the number of victims decreased: 5 soldiers were killed and 19 injured, compared with the 45 killed and 80 injured in the previous reporting period. Attacks against the Malian security and defence forces were most heavily concentrated in Mopti (11), followed by Ségou (4) and Timbuktu (3). Moreover, a series of clashes in the Ménaka region between signatory armed groups and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara resulted in 19 members of the signatory armed groups being killed and 15 injured, compared with 20 members killed and 12 injured in attacks in the previous reporting period.

29. Since the beginning of 2018, the number of improvised explosive device incidents almost doubled, compared with the same period in 2017, with 93 incidents as at 18 May, compared with 55 incidents in 2017. As the increasing threat of improvised explosive device incidents expands towards more populated areas of central Mali, civilians are increasingly affected.

B. Protection of civilians

30. In the centre of Mali, the protective environment continued to deteriorate during the reporting period, in which at least 43 civilians were killed and 24 injured in targeted attacks and intercommunity conflicts, and many more were temporarily displaced. All districts of Mopti region, especially Koro district, as well as Niono and Macina districts of Ségou region, were affected by instability. On 28 March, only two days after the visit of the Prime Minister, a woman was injured in an attack on a hotel in Bandiagara district, where such occurrences of violent incidents had been rare so far. Communities not previously targeted by radical armed elements also came under attack, including: Bozo fishermen in Djenné and Ténenkou districts in three separate incidents in March, and on 14 April, two traders of the Diokaramé ethnic group were abducted in Mopti district, allegedly for having collaborated with Malian forces. Malian civilian authorities continued to be targeted, such as on 20 March, when a local electoral commission official was murdered in Niono district.

31. In response to the deteriorating security situation in the centre of the country, on 14 April, the Prime Minister instructed that civilians in the central region in possession of firearms were to be disarmed, including those who held licences. Furthermore, in early May, two Malian forces helicopters were put on standby in Mopti, while Malian defence forces patrols were deployed to affected localities of Koro district. Those positive measures notwithstanding, mounting allegations of summary executions and abuses by members of the Malian defence and security forces continued to be reported and to have an impact on their ability to restore stability. Notably, the implementation of a ban imposed on the use of motorbikes and

pickup trucks in the Mopti region and parts of the Ségou region led to targeted operations, in which some cases of excessive use of force and summary executions were reported, such as in the alleged cases of excessive force that resulted in the killing of two Fulani herders by the Malian armed forces on 28 April in Ténenkou district.

32. From 25 to 28 March, MINUSMA conducted Operation Faden, which enabled a joint civilian team's missions to five localities in Koro district for the purpose of improving their situational awareness, including on the rollout of the Government's plan to secure the centre. From 18 to 24 April, Operation Foronto facilitated similar joint civilian missions to four localities in the Mopti district.

33. A reconciliation mission led by the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion travelled to the Mopti region from 21 to 26 March. A commission was established by the Government to follow up on the mission's recommendations, which focused on improving protection, initiating dialogue with radical elements and revitalizing youth employment.

34. In late April, a series of violent incidents occurred in the Ménaka region, near the border with the Niger. On 26 and 27 April, two violent incidents in the Aklaz and Awakassa settlements resulted in the killing of at least 47 civilians and the displacement of around 300 others. On 1 May, 17 civilians were reportedly killed in the locality of Tindinbawen. The victims of those incidents, mostly from the Dawsahak Tuareg community, were reportedly targeted in an act of reprisal following operations conducted in the area by a coalition of armed groups. In the same period, incidents of retaliatory violence against Fulani communities were reported on the Niger side of the border, resulting in further casualties.

IV. Human rights situation

35. During the reporting period, MINUSMA documented 344 cases of human rights violations and abuses, involving at least 475 victims, compared with 133 cases and 483 victims in the previous reporting period. There were, inter alia, 239 cases of extrajudicial execution or other arbitrary killing, 25 cases of abduction or enforced disappearance, six cases of torture or ill-treatment and 42 cases of unlawful detention. Members of the Malian defence and security forces were involved in 58 violations. Signatory groups and non-signatory or splinter groups were responsible for 43 and 105 cases of human rights abuses, respectively. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims and other similar groups were responsible for a total of 138 cases, 90 per cent of which occurred in the Ménaka Mopti and Ségou regions. In addition, two cases of conflict-related sexual violence in the Gao region were documented.

36. On 19 May, elements of the Malian armed forces under the command of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel reportedly killed at least 12 civilians during an operation carried out in retaliation for the killing of one of their elements in Boulikessi, Mopti region. At the request of the Chief of Staff of the Joint Force, the Mission is providing support to the Joint Force in conducting an in situ investigation into those incidents. On 9 May, the Prime Minister reiterated that abuses against the civilian population would not be tolerated by the Government.

37. MINUSMA investigated serious allegations of violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in the context of counter-terrorism operations undertaken by the Malian armed forces in the Mopti and Ségou regions, including allegations of 44 summary executions and three enforced disappearances in Bimbéré-Tama, Diankabou, Dioura, Mondoro, Ouro-Guiré and Sokolo communes. The Mission issued two public statements expressing concern over the grave human rights

violations by the Malian armed forces and informed the Government of its readiness to support investigations.

38. As a result of a cycle of violence in the Mopti region, and after having conducted an investigation, the Mission concluded that traditional hunters in Koro and Bankass (Koro district) had burned down three villages and attacked two others, and that intercommunity conflict in the same area had caused the death of at least 12 people and the forced displacement of hundreds, affecting at least 30 villages. The Government issued two public statements committing to undertaking criminal investigations into those allegations.

39. MINUSMA also investigated allegations of grave human rights abuses by the coalition of the Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad and Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés in the Niger border area of Ménaka region. The Mission concluded that at least 143 civilians had been killed by the armed groups, houses had been burned and hundreds forcibly displaced, including 695 from Aklaz and Awakassa villages.

40. During the reporting period, more than 640 individuals appeared before the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. As at 30 May, the Commission reported that it had received a total of 8,273 depositions since 3 January 2017. No progress was made, however, in the Sanogo trial or the trials of the alleged perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence in 2012 and 2013.

41. During the reporting period, MINUSMA assessed the level of implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in Mali to be relatively low, given that about one fifth of the recommended measures to mitigate the risk of violations had been implemented by the recipient entities. The measures include the opening of investigations in Timbuktu in a case of sexual violence and in Bamako in a case of summary execution, and the dismissal of two members from the Operational Coordination Mechanism site in Gao.

42. The country task force on monitoring and reporting verified 49 grave violations against children. Ten children were killed and nine maimed in the Kidal, Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu regions; seven children were separated from armed groups in the Ménaka, Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu regions and are now following a reintegration programme in Bamako and Gao; there were 13 cases of attacks and threats against schools and hospitals; and 10 cases of denial of humanitarian access.

43. In March and April, the Mission delivered training courses on human rights for 352 members of the Malian armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police force; on child protection for 35 members of the Malian armed forces; on monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children in periods of armed conflict for 27 national and international partners; and on receiving and referring victims of sexual violence for 14 gender focal points from the national police. From 5 to 11 April, the Mission and national partners organized a sensitization campaign on HIV/AIDS and human rights, reaching 320 people, 201 of whom were tested for HIV. In addition, from 7 to 15 May, they provided a sensitization briefing on HIV prevention and conflict-related sexual violence to 951 women and girls in Mopti and Timbuktu, 789 of whom were tested for HIV.

V. Humanitarian situation

44. The humanitarian situation continued to worsen, owing to growing insecurity in the northern and central regions, limited State presence and insufficient funding for meeting current needs, while concerns over the looming agropastoral and nutrition crisis deepened.

45. At the end of March, the humanitarian outlook for the lean season (June through September) was worse than had been projected in late 2017, owing to the impending agropastoral and nutrition crisis, with 4.3 million people expected to be food insecure during the lean season in 2018, compared with 4.1 million projected in late 2017. Almost 1 million people will require emergency food assistance, a 55 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2017. The projected number of children suffering from global acute malnutrition increased from 622,000 to 856,000 between 2017 and 2018. During the reporting period, the United Nations and its partners supported the Government in providing food assistance to 155,000 people per month. The humanitarian response plan for 2018, which is aimed at providing lifesaving assistance to 1.56 million people, had received only 24 per cent of the $263 million required as at 30 May.

46. During the reporting period, 50 security incidents, mostly involving break-ins at compounds and vehicle thefts, affected humanitarian actors, compared with 41 cases in the previous reporting period. In response to the expansion of the threat of improvised explosive device incidents in central Mali, the Mission provided awareness-raising training to 155 drivers from humanitarian non-governmental organizations and private companies operating in the Gao and Mopti regions on the threat of improvised explosive devices.

47. As at 23 May, the Government had registered 60,600 internally displaced persons, 590,800 returnees and 576 asylum seekers, compared with 47,700 internally displaced persons, 589,600 returnees and 554 asylum seekers in January 2018. Although Mali hosts 19,374 refugees from various countries, more than 137,697 Malian refugees remain in neighbouring countries.

48. As at May 2018, 750 schools remained closed in the Kidal, Gao, Ménaka, Timbuktu, Mopti and Ségou regions, owing to insecurity, including threats and attacks from violent extremists, compared with 715 schools in March 2018. As a result, 225,000 children were denied access to education. In response, 50 community learning centres were created by the United Nations Children's Fund and its partners in the Gao and Mopti regions, providing informal education in a safe environment for up to 2,500 children.

VI. Economic development and cultural preservation

49. During the reporting period, the Mission supported the Government's plan for securing the centre of the country through quick-impact projects and the provision of institutional support to regional authorities. On 29 March, MINUSMA, together with the Government and the United Nations country team launched a Peacebuilding Fund project targeting women and young people in central Mali. The project was developed in line with the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, and aims at funding innovative projects for 500 young people, with a view to strengthening social cohesion in the Ségou and Mopti regions. Another Peacebuilding Fund programme was launched on 26 April in Dori, Burkina Faso, to promote community security, social cohesion and resilience in the Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger cross-border area.

50. MINUSMA and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization continued to raise awareness of the need to safeguard cultural heritage, to combat the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and to provide support to cultural, artistic, educational and rehabilitation projects.

VII. Conduct and discipline

51. During the reporting period, one allegation of sexual abuse was reported to the Mission, against a former local individual contractor. The case was referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services and the national police. One case reported in January 2018 is pending investigation with the Office. Administrative measures have been taken, pending the outcome of the investigation. Two allegations received in 2017 are pending investigation by the relevant troop-contributing country and the Office. MINUSMA continued to implement the three-pronged strategy for combating sexual exploitation and abuse, through enforcement measures, assistance to victims and training and outreach activities to inform personnel and the local population about the United Nations policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse.

VIII. Environment

52. During the reporting period, the Mission focused on systemizing the collection of environmental management data, to improve performance measurement, and made progress towards reducing energy inefficiencies by using smart meters for power generation, LEDs and solar street lighting. The use of recycled water processed through treatment plants in the Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu supercamps significantly reduced their water requirements, and solid and biomedical waste continued to be partly recycled or treated prior to disposal. Contractual services are being sought for hazardous waste management.

IX. Independent strategic review of the Mission

53. Against the backdrop of the mixed progress and deteriorating conditions in Mali described above, an independent strategic review of MINUSMA was conducted in early 2018, at my request. The review team, led by Ms. Løj, was comprised of experts from various United Nations entities. The review consulted a broad cross-section of stakeholders and visited Mali, including the Bamako Gao, Kidal and Mopti regions, from 14 to 25 March.

A. Findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review

Findings

54. With regard to the political situation, the assessment of the review team was that, in the three years since the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, it had not resulted in enough meaningful progress on the ground. Furthermore, the presence of the State had declined compared with the previous year (20 per cent of sub-prefects were deployed in the north of the country at the commune level in 2017, compared with 36 per cent in 2016). The review team attributed that situation to insufficient ownership of the Agreement by the Malian people, trust deficits between the signatory parties and an uneven political will. The review team also highlighted a need for a clear connection between parties to the Agreement and key constituencies of Malian society, including women. It concluded, however, that, in the absence of an immediate viable alternative or the inclination to determine one, the Agreement remained a valid framework for engagement with the parties to the peace process, and that its implementation must be leveraged and accompanied by broader political efforts by Malian, regional and international actors. Challenging the Agreement or reopening it would create a dangerous vacuum.

55. With regard to the security environment, the review team took note of the fact that it had worsened since the signing of the Agreement. In its assessment, the review team found that the violence had evolved into a war of attrition, primarily targeting State representatives, MINUSMA and international forces, while divisions among communities had deepened. The review team also noted that the complexity of the composition of armed groups and the grievances of their members must be taken into account in finding appropriate responses. In its view, parties had shifted their focus away from the implementation of the Agreement to the protection of their equities in the north, having an impact on the progress made in the implementation of defence and security reforms.

56. The review team found that the threats against civilians were insidious and sophisticated, in particular in the centre of the country, where intercommunal tensions were being instrumentalized and extreme forms of Islamic law imposed, resulting in serious human rights violations. Compounding the situation was the fact that the majority of the reported human rights abuses committed by State actors took place in the context of counter-terrorism operations. The assessment of the review team was that growing instability in central Mali must be addressed through a multidimensional approach focusing on conflict resolution and confidence-building measures, accompanied by the gradual return of a legitimate and accountable State, would bring long-term stability to the central regions.

57. Therefore, the review team confirmed that the situation in the central regions was a serious source of concern, with the potential for further spillover if not carefully addressed. They suggested that there was a tendency to associate the worsening situation only with the expansion of the influence of terrorism and organized crime from the north; local dynamics and fundamental causes of instability, such as the multiplicity of localized conflicts over resources and land, climate change, the growing population and power struggles, must be taken into account. The review team observed that, to address the situation, a truly integrated plan that takes into account the collective of the security, governance, reconciliation and development aspects, was needed.

58. The review team confirmed that the immediate and regional neighbours to Mali are an inextricable part of the political dynamics in the country, in particular in the northern regions, and integral to the solution to the challenges facing the country. On the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the review team considered that its achievements could be limited, at least initially, if its capacity limitations were not urgently addressed. They also underlined the need for a clear regional political framework, including on how to best support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by leveraging the influence of the country's neighbours on the signatory parties.

59. As the sole entity with a presence across northern and part of central Mali, and owing to the constraints and delays encountered in carrying out the process envisioned in Security Council resolution 2295 (2016) for the restoration and extension of State authority to the central and northern regions, the assessment of the review team was that MINUSMA had been called upon to undertake a variety of tasks, including having become a logistics and security enabler for non-United Nations security actors. The review team was of the view that the proximity of MINUSMA, and its support role and cooperation with security actors, including counter-terrorism actors, had contributed to the perception that the Mission was engaging in counter-terrorism actions. The review team noted that MINUSMA faced a dilemma between the need to reform and reconstitute the Malian defence and security forces and simultaneously support the existing forces in addressing the current situation of instability.

60. The assessment of the review team was that the Mission faced difficulties in balancing the safety and security of personnel, with operational reach. According to the review team, some 70 per cent of the casualties sustained by the Mission had been in the context of attacks either on the force protection of bases and infrastructure or during logistics convoys. On average, 80 per cent of the resources of the MINUSMA force were being employed to provide pockets of security covering a radius of 5 to 20 kilometres, protecting major population centres in the north. The review team estimated that chronic mobility shortfalls and the operational environment would likely continue to challenge the Mission's ability to project its presence and implement its mandate, and therefore called for greater prioritization of tasks.

61. In terms of development and humanitarian efforts, five consecutive years of growth in the gross domestic product of Mali notwithstanding, the assessment of the review team was that peace dividends had yet to materialize in the north of the country. In fact, poverty had increased and basic social services in areas above the Niger River belt remained largely inaccessible. The closure of 35 per cent of schools in the northern and central regions, high rate of youth unemployment and perceptions of injustice had contributed to the population's vulnerability to radicalization. Humanitarian needs had been approaching levels similar to those at the peak of the crisis in 2012. Some 4.3 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2018 to date (up from 3.8 million in 2017), with a looming food security and nutrition crisis. The number of people facing severe food insecurity had increased by 55 per cent, relative to the lean season in 2017, and the severity of conditions had deepened. In addition, over 2 million people continued to be affected by a lack of access to water, sanitation and hygiene and health services. Absent State institutions and resources, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations remained the main provider of basic services.

62. The review team noted the significant role of the informal and illicit economy and traditional trans-Saharan trade routes in influencing conflict dynamics. It was the review team's assessment that control over routes had exacerbated competition and the shifting of alliances among armed groups and communities, at times resulting in local arrangements that obviated or superseded the Agreement. A deep understanding of the political economy, including organized crime networks, was therefore required in order to define effective strategies to support long-term peace and stability. The review team noted that, although the Agreement focused on historical disparities, it also contained governance and economic reforms that had nationwide implications. Without ignoring the specific needs of the north, which needed to be addressed, the review team suggested that the Agreement should be part of a comprehensive national vision for peace, reconciliation and development for all Malians.

63. In that complex environment largely dominated by security actors, the review team was of the view that the United Nations system in Mali had been challenged in its efforts to fully leverage the comparative advantages of MINUSMA and specific agencies, funds and programmes and to deliver as one. The review team took stock of the limited presence and operational capacity of the United Nations country team in conflict-affected areas, and given that limited presence, MINUSMA had therefore increasingly played a role in project implementation in humanitarian and development areas, a situation that should be reversed. Furthermore, the review team took note of the complicated policy environment, in which multiple national development plans and coordination mechanisms, and the frequent turnover of key Government counterparts, had an impact on priority-setting and coordination. That environment, coupled with dwindling funding for the humanitarian response plan and development assistance framework had limited the scope of humanitarian and development impact.

Recommendations of the independent strategic review: prioritization and implementation of the Mission mandate

64. It was the review team's assessment that, although the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali remained the valid framework, it needed to be accompanied by sustained political momentum and leveraged to promote trust-building between the north and south of the country, the centre and the periphery and key constituencies across Mali, in particular women and young people. MINUSMA had a key role to play in that respect, and the review team recommended that the Mission's role should be more directed towards a broadened political one, including: (a) rallying a common vision among regional and international actors in support of the peace process and stabilization; (b) developing a pact for peace between the Government, the Security Council, the United Nations and international partners, under which assistance would be associated with clear benchmarks, including regarding progress on good governance and political reforms; and (c) supporting a national dialogue to foster ownership of the Agreement by the Malian people and to strengthen Malian nationhood beyond State reform.

65. The review team indicated that MINUSMA, with international partners of Mali and the United Nations country team, should reprioritize its actions to focus on political tasks, including through the development of a political strategy that focuses the Mission's activities towards the implementation of key provisions of the Agreement, including decentralization, the effective establishment of legitimate State presence, security sector reform and reconciliation. In central Mali, the focus should be on conflict prevention and resolution at the local level and contributing to the protection of civilians through dialogue, community outreach and policing, as well as efforts to create a protective environment. The Mission should orient its resources and efforts according to those priorities. Activities that do not respond to those priorities and good offices requirements should be staggered in their implementation or phased out.

66. As part of the refocusing of the Mission's role on political issues, the review team emphasized that the Mission should also support the long-term goal of addressing governance deficits. They indicated that the redeployment of reformed and reconstituted Malian defence and security forces is crucial to restoring security. Other governance functions, including the delivery of basic social services and political participation, in particular through decentralization, at the core of the Agreement are also be key to building and strengthening the legitimacy of the State in the northern and central regions.

67. The review team suggested taking a more realistic approach to the objectives set for the MINUSMA force, given its limitations. To further reinforce its prevention and conflict resolution efforts, MINUSMA must tailor its approach to the protection of civilians around community engagement and policing, violence reduction and institution-building, including with a greater articulation of the work of the different components of the Mission to that end. In that regard, the MINUSMA force should direct its efforts towards creating space for the civilian component of the Mission to deliver on its mandated tasks. More specifically, in the centre of the country, that recalibrated approach should be part of a multidimensional United Nations strategy that would include an adequate uniformed presence.

68. Recognizing that addressing instability requires a coherent comprehensive and integrated approach to tackling all dimensions of insecurity, including the effective reform of the Malian security institutions, the review team recommended that supporting security sector reform should feature among the chief political endeavours of MINUSMA. The Mission should rally international partners around a common vision for rebuilding the Malian security sector, a task that operationally extends

beyond the life cycle of a peacekeeping mission. Its role should be that of establishing a clear link between the political efforts geared at advancing security sector reform and the operational and technical support being provided to the reconstituted and reformed Malian forces by international partners of Mali. That should be underpinned by the active coordination between the various actors involved and seeking innovative approaches to address the shortcomings of interim security and defence measures.

69. The review team was of the view that the Mission should continue its valuable monitoring, investigation, advocacy and reporting on the human rights situation and provision of support to the training of the Malian forces aimed at promoting the full respect of human rights standards, in particular when conducting counter-terrorism operations. The review team recommended that the Mission strengthen its cooperation with the Malian authorities so as to support investigations of and follow-up to allegations of human rights violations, while enhancing its public human rights reporting, in particular with regard to the situation in the central regions.

70. The review team stressed the importance of strengthening and enhancing collaboration between the United Nations country team and MINUSMA in supporting the restoration of governance functions, recommending the development of an integrated strategic framework setting the United Nations overall vision and joint priorities for sustaining peace in Mali, which should be followed by the revision of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework after the presidential elections. The review team recommended the development of the Mission's implementation strategy requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2364 (2017) on the basis of those two processes. The review team suggested that MINUSMA should continue to focus on the political and security components of the Agreement, recalibrating its programmatic activities and its use of quick-impact projects to bring them in line with those priorities, whereas the United Nations country team should take the lead in humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding efforts. The review team also called upon the United Nations country team to enhance its presence in the north and centre of the country.

71. The review team recommended that the United Nations establish clear parameters on service provision to non-United Nations entities. Such parameters would help to preserve and enhance the Mission's impartiality and its political space. Furthermore, accountability mechanisms and access for human rights actors for timely human rights monitoring should be preconditions for any United Nations support. The review team emphasized the importance of the Mission continuing and strengthening its implementation of the human rights due diligence policy. With regard to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel specifically, the review team concurred with my earlier recommended that support to the Joint Force be provided through an assessed contributions-based support package, distinct from MINUSMA.

72. Against the recommendations above pertaining to the Mission's mandate, the review recommends the realignment of United Nations peacekeeping efforts whereby MINUSMA would refocus on its core political tasks. In that regard, the footprint of the Mission would be adjusted in Sector North and reassessed across the country to allocate more resources to the direct implementation of Mission priorities and to support an increased civilian presence in the centre of the country, with a view to taking a more balanced strategy there. A tailored approach to the protection of civilians would be adopted, and its military and police components would be leveraged to create the maximum space for others to operate. The current overall uniformed personnel ceiling would remain unchanged, although the military component would be slightly adjusted through consolidation of bases to create the space for one additional formed police unit and 10 individual police officers in the centre. The consolidation of bases would also be aimed at reducing the exposure of

the Mission, in particular of convoys, to attacks. Taking note of the proposed pact for peace, I suggest that, building on the existing benchmarks and road map, this would serve as a tool for the periodic review of the footprint of the Mission against the achievement of core priorities and of overall United Nations engagement.

B. Mandate renewal

73. The independent strategic review team has accurately portrayed the political and security dynamics at play in Mali and the operational environment in which MINUSMA operates.

74. In my view, the recommendations for a shift in focus, prioritization and implementation of the Mission's mandated tasks would maximize the Mission's role in support of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and in amplifying the peace process. They take into consideration the comparative advantages of the Mission, notably its good offices, and of the United Nations system as a whole, while factoring in the constraints posed by the operational theatre in Mali and the difficulties in generating resources for United Nations efforts. As such, I encourage that they be taken into account in the Security Council's deliberations on the Mission's mandate renewal, as well as in the strategic planning documents that guide both the Mission's engagement on the ground and its cooperation with other actors. Prioritizing and staggering the implementation of tasks are key to furthering peace in response to the specific conditions in Mali, yet it must be borne in mind that reforming institutions takes time and is the primary responsibility of the people and Government of Mali.

75. I intend to explore ways of broadening the political role played by MINUSMA in support of the peace process, in line with the recommendation in the strategic review on the elaboration of a pact for peace. Such an initiative would take into account the existing benchmarks and road map agreed upon between the signatory parties and MINUSMA and help to consolidate momentum towards the implementation of the Agreement by enhancing political dialogue. It would also potentially reinvigorate the commitment of international and regional partners in support of the peace process. Moving forward, and as mentioned during my recent visit, the Mission's political role should be further enhanced in support of the key political and security reforms that are provided for in the peace agreement, in parallel to ongoing efforts by the Mission, together with other partners such as the European Union, to support the redeployment and professionalization of the Malian defence and security forces.

76. The period leading up to the presidential elections in July and its immediate aftermath will be critical for sustaining the political momentum surrounding the peace process and the parties' engagement in the implementation of the Agreement. In that context, it should be acknowledged that the signatory parties have shown tangible signs of their determination to move forward in the implementation of the Agreement, with some concrete steps taken during the reporting period. Furthermore, and as acknowledged by the review team, the Agreement can lay the foundation for lasting peace, provided that sustained political will by the parties allows for building on the gains secured through the implementation of the key institutional reforms undertaken. The Agreement also remains the only viable avenue for a constructive dialogue, and, as such, it should be leveraged by the parties, MINUSMA and the international community to build a stronger, more inclusive and sustainable peace process that would deliver long-awaited peace dividends to the Malian people.

77. In the light of those considerations, it is my view that a reconfiguration of the posture and focus of MINUSMA, as outlined in the recommendation of the review team, would be the most appropriate course of action at the present juncture. The

decision to pursue further adjustments of the footprint of the Mission would be determined by progress made on good governance and institutional reforms, measured through the benchmarks of the pact for peace and an assessment of the practical modalities and operational implications of their implementation.

X. Observations

78. As witnessed during my visit to Mali from 29 to 30 May, in particular in my meeting with the signatory parties and mediation partners, progress has been made in recent months on the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, notably the adoption in March of a new road map for its implementation, which takes stock of the delays accumulated to date and what can concretely be achieved prior to the presidential elections. I welcome the recent establishment of the mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism sites in Kidal and Timbuktu, the pre-registration of combatants, and the visit of the Prime Minister to the northern regions, including his visit to Kidal. Those efforts demonstrate that progress is possible if there is political will and dialogue. The signatory parties should capitalize on those steps to prompt concrete change on the ground.

79. The holding of inclusive, transparent and credible elections will be critical to securing the gains achieved to date by the parties in the implementation of the Agreement and to building on them. It is crucial that all parties work together to ensure that conditions are met for the elections to be conducted in a peaceful environment. I welcome the electoral reforms undertaken by the Government of Mali and the demonstration of goodwill by all parties in supporting the electoral process so far, including through the priority actions included in the road map adopted on 22 March. It will be important for the Government, supported by MINUSMA, to create conditions conducive to the holding of secure, peaceful and transparent elections. That includes establishing a meaningful dialogue with the political opposition and civil society on the electoral process.

80. I am concerned by the continued deterioration of the security situation in central Mali, characterized by an increase in the complexity of attacks against MINUSMA, the Malian armed forces and international forces, an unprecedented number of civilian casualties and a rise in intercommunity clashes. I was informed that security incidents have increased by 200 per cent during the past year, with over 1,000 incidents registered by MINUSMA in the Mopti region and dozens of people killed. Failure to contain the crisis in the central regions could have a serious impact on the stabilization of the country as a whole and on social cohesion, and could reverse gains realized to date. This should be the priority of the Government, in particular with a view to securing the elections.

81. In that context, I would like to thank the independent strategic review team, led by Ms. Løj, for its work. Its findings and recommendations will guide the Mission's mandate renewal and help to ensure a better alignment of the Mission's objectives and strategic vision with the political and security context in Mali, as well as with the Mission's available resources. Although adjusting the mandate might present some challenges, given that the presidential elections are to be held in one month, it should also be welcomed by national and regional partners as encouragement to redouble efforts towards the consolidation of peace. It is also an acknowledgment of our continued engagement in Mali.

82. The Mission's mandate renewal must be accompanied, however, by a clear message that concrete progress in the implementation of the Agreement must be achieved and accelerated alongside a national dialogue, following up on the conference of national understanding held in March 2017. In that respect, it is time to

start a frank and constructive dialogue. I welcome the proposal of the strategic review team for the Government of Mali, the Security Council, the United Nations and international partners to develop a pact for peace, taking into account the existing benchmarks and road map, for which assistance and progress in terms of governance, political reforms and the implementation of the Agreement are measured against benchmarks. The pact will also ensure strategic coherence and the complementarity of actions by partners of Mali towards common objectives. This will guide United Nations engagement, according to progress made on the political and security domains, and could lead to further adjustments being made to MINUSMA.

83. Five years after the establishment of MINUSMA and three years after the signature of the Agreement, Mali is at crossroads. I am concerned by the findings of the independent strategic review team, which have highlighted the complexity and fragility of the situation, as well as the challenging operational environment in which MINUSMA operates. The security situation has deteriorated, and divisions among communities have deepened, affecting national social cohesion and neighbouring countries. Some recent progress notwithstanding, if unchanged, in the long term, keeping the current pace of implementation of the Agreement risks undermining its credibility and its potential as a tool for lasting peace.

84. MINUSMA continues to face a critical shortfall in equipment, which significantly limits its ability to implement its mandate. The speedy provision of military helicopters to the Mission will be instrumental ahead of the upcoming elections and the start of the rainy season. I encourage Member States to move forward with the concept of equipment-contributing countries, should the Mission's troop- and police-contributing countries not be in a position to provide the required equipment in accordance with their memorandums of understanding signed with the United Nations.

85. The context in Mali underscores the importance of having a shared vision of peacekeeping based on a realistic assessment of what is achievable and needed by the people. With almost 174 Mission peacekeepers killed, 101 of whom were killed in hostile action, since the establishment of the Mission, and limited progress made on the ground, the current situation is not sustainable. Efforts to implement the recommendations of the report on improving the security of United Nations peacekeepers, as well as to strengthen the security of MINUSMA premises, are under way. I commend MINUSMA, international forces and the Malian defence and security forces for their courageous and effective response to the 14 April terrorist attack in Timbuktu.

86. The allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations in central Mali and the Ménaka region are of concern. MINUSMA stands ready to support the authorities in carrying out investigations and calls for those responsible for those violations to be held to account. I urge international and national forces to ensure that military operations are conducted in accordance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

87. During my visit to the Mopti region, I was made keenly aware of the depth of the agropastoral and nutrition crisis, in a context where the number of people in need of emergency food assistance has doubled over the past year. The dire food situation, which is likely to further deteriorate absent an early response at the required scale, requires the urgent mobilization of the international community. I also encourage all partners to focus their efforts on improving the humanitarian situation and access to basic social services and creating income-generating opportunities to address the growing concerns regarding unemployment, marginalization and exclusion, which continue to fuel recruitment by violent extremist elements.

88. Continued concerns were expressed during my visit about the spillover of the insecurity on neighbouring countries. I remain fully supportive of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, which remains a fundamental aspect of the multidimensional response required to address instability in the Sahel. MINUSMA stands ready to provide operational and logistical support to the Joint Force, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2391 (2017). I continue to hold the view, however, that stronger support to the Joint Force, including with predictable and sustainable financial resources, is critical to ensuring the success of that initiative.

89. I welcome the report of the independent observer, and the observations therein on the implementation of the Agreement during the period from 15 January to 30 April. The work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali and the application of the tools available to it, together with the efforts of the independent observer, in addition to the benchmarks that would be tied to the pact for peace, will hopefully contribute to increasing momentum on the implementation of the Agreement, as well as to the broader peace process and needed institutional and governance reforms. They will also inform an objective assessment of the progress realized. I call upon the Security Council to support my recommendation, as well as the proposed priorities and staggering the implementation of the Mission's mandate, as informed by the strategic review.

90. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that the Agreement remains the cornerstone of the peace process in Mali, its potential to spur national dialogue and governance reform, with a beneficial impact beyond the northern regions, is undoubted, and MINUSMA has a key role to play in supporting it. In that regard, I recommend that the mandate of MINUSMA should be extended for another year, until 30 June 2019, it being adjusted according to the priority areas and with a configuration as proposed in the strategic review and outlined in my recommendation above. The Mission's posture would then be kept under regular review in the light of the evolution of the peace process.

91. I commend my Special Representative, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, and all United Nations entities operating on the ground, including humanitarian actors who operate in a very challenging environment, for their service. I am grateful to the international mediation team, including the lead mediator, Algeria, regional and international organizations, including the Group of Five for the Sahel, the European Union, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their support towards the restoration of peace and stability in Mali.

Annex I

Military and police strength of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali as at 22 May 2018

	Military			*Police*								
	Staff officers and in units			*Individual police officers*			*In formed police units*			*Total police*		
Country	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
Armenia	1		1									
Austria	3		3									
Bangladesh	1 373	14	1 387				278		278	278		278
Belgium	98	7	105									
Benin	256	4	260	18	2	20	139	1	140	157	3	160
Bhutan	4		4									
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2		2									
Burkina Faso	1 648	68	1 716	15	5	20	133	6	139	148	11	159
Burundi	1	1	2									
Cambodia	277	25	302									
Cameroon	2	1	3	16	4	20				16	4	20
Chad	1 440	2	1 442	16	5	21				16	5	21
China	389	14	403									
Côte d'Ivoire	156	4	160	19	5	24				19	5	24
Czechia	5		5									
Denmark	1		1									
Egypt	335		335	3		3	135		135	138		138
El Salvador	94	11	105									
Estonia	3		3									
Ethiopia	1		1									
Finland	5		5	5	1	6				5	1	6
France	24		24	10	2	12				10	2	12
Gambia	4		4									
Germany	676	18	694	7	0	7				7	0	7
Ghana	165		165									
Guatemala	2		2									
Guinea	858	11	869	11	10	21				11	10	21
Hungary				1		1				1		1
Indonesia	11		11									
Italy	1	1	2	2		2				2		2
Jordan	10		10	8		8				8		8
Kenya	7	1	8									
Latvia	8	1	9									
Liberia	76	6	82									
Lithuania	36	3	39									
Madagascar				1		1				1		1
Mauritania	7		7									

	Military			*Police*								
	Staff officers and in units			*Individual police officers*			*In formed police units*			*Total police*		
Country	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
Mexico	1		1									
Nepal	198	2	200									
Netherlands	259	13	272	4	2	6				4	2	6
New Zealand		1	1									
Niger	856	8	864	19	11	30				19	11	30
Nigeria	71	15	86	2	5	7	125	14	139	127	19	146
Norway	14	1	15									
Pakistan	3		3									
Portugal	2		2	1		1				1		1
Romania	2		2	6		6				6		6
Senegal	1 041	14	1 055	29	1	30	286	29	315	315	30	345
Sierra Leone	12	2	14									
Spain	1		1	2		2				2		2
Sri Lanka	207		207									
Sweden	260	28	288	6	1	7				6	1	7
Switzerland	5	1	6	4		4				4		4
Togo	900	38	938	13		13	271	19	290	284	19	303
Tunisia	2	1	3	27	2	29				27	2	29
Turkey				2		2				2		2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2		2									
United States of America	29	8	37									
Yemen	2		2	2		2				2		2
Total	**11 845**	**324**	**12 169**	**249**	**56**	**305**	**1 367**	**69**	**1 436**	**1 616**	**125**	**1 741**

Annex II

Map


MINUSMA
Deployment
June 2018
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
NIGER
BURKINA FASO
GHANA
TOGO
BENIN
NIGERIA
GUINEA
SENEGAL
Sector WEST
Sector NORTH
Sector EAST
Sector SOUTH
Kidal
Tessalit
Aguelhok
Anefis
Menaka
Bourem
Gao
Ansongo
Tombouctou
Goundam
Douentza
Mopti / Sevare
Segou
Koulikoro
Bamako
Kati
Kayes
Nioro du Sahel
Aourou
Diema
Sikasso
Koutiala
Yanfolila
Kolondieba
Bougouni
Kankan
Ayounel Arrouis
Tambacounda
Batoulibe
Nampala
Djabali
Niono
Ber
Gossi
Lere
Ouagadougou
Koro
San
Menaka
National capital
Regional capital
Town, village
Major airport
International boundary
Regional boundary
Sector line
Main road
Other road
Track
Railroad
Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)
Map No. 4558 Rev. 24 UNITED NATIONS
June 2018 (Colour)

United Nations S/2018/542

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 June 2018

Original: English

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) imposing the arms embargo on Libya and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

Recalling its resolutions 2292 (2016) and 2357 (2017) concerning the strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the authorizations as set out in resolution 2357 for a further 12 months from the date of this resolution;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on its implementation;

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

18-09546 (E) 120618

Please recycle

United Nations S/2018/543

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 June 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to inform you of Lebanese violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), breaches of Israeli sovereignty and repeated crossings of the Blue Line during the month of April 2018. A comprehensive list of these violations is included in the annex to the present letter.

As outlined in the present letter, as well as in previous letters that I have sent, Lebanese violations of resolution 1701 (2006) occur daily. Yet despite their visibility and frequency, the vast majority of these violations are consistently excluded from the reports of the Secretariat.

I trust that forthcoming reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) will reflect these ongoing violations and demand that the Lebanese Government abide by its commitment under the resolution.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-09323 (E) 120618

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Lebanese violations as reported by the Israel Defense Forces, April 2018

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
1	1 April	0823	Four armed men were observed in the vicinity of AOP 10
2	1 April	1249	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
3	1 April	1422	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 32
4	1 April	1531	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
5	1 April	1540	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
6	1 April	1643	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 66 (1)
7	1 April	1803	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 68
8	1 April	1842	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of BP 31 (1)
9	2 April	0740	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
10	2 April	1059	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
11	2 April	1100	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of TP 36
12	2 April	1104	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 264
13	2 April	1153	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
14	2 April	1419	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 7
15	2 April	1458	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AOP 6 Bastrah
16	2 April	1610	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
17	2 April	1633	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 57
18	3 April	0718	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP
19	3 April	0730	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 60
20	3 April	1140	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of TP 36 (1)

Abbreviations: AOP, alternate observation post; AP, additional point; B, barrel; BP, boundary pillar; M, point on the Blue Line (marked after 2000); recce, reconnaissance; TP, technical post; UNP, United Nations post.

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
21	3 April	1443	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 28
22	3 April	1548	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 33 (1)
23	3 April	1558	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 24 (1)
24	4 April	0835	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 65
25	4 April	0840	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 10/1
26	4 April	1116	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP
27	4 April	1200	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 65
28	4 April	1240	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 57
29	4 April	1244	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
30	4 April	1330	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 43 (1)
31	4 April	1433	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP
32	4 April	1505	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 33 (B)
33	4 April	1743	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 571
34	5 April	0819	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of TP 16
35	5 April	1050	Nine Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 66
36	5 April	1103	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 14
37	5 April	1103	Two Hizbullah militants were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of BP 14
38	5 April	1125	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
39	5 April	1142	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
40	5 April	1200	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
41	5 April	1210	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 79
42	5 April	1448	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
43	5 April	1506	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce and throwing rocks towards the fence in the vicinity of BP 24 (1)
44	5 April	1640	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
45	5 April	1656	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 6 Bastrah
46	6 April	0820	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
47	6 April	0910	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 51
48	6 April	1104	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 7/1
49	6 April	1105	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 61 (2)
50	6 April	1130	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
51	6 April	1140	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
52	6 April	1243	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 62 (2)
53	6 April	1249	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
54	6 April	1418	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 59 (1)
55	6 April	1433	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
56	7 April	0658	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 50
57	7 April	1059	Seven Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 74 (B)
58	7 April	1126	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
59	7 April	1130	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
60	7 April	1156	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 59
61	7 April	1404	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP CHEB
62	7 April	1533	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
63	7 April	1651	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
64	8 April	1036	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 68
65	8 April	1215	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of TP 37 (1)
66	8 April	1230	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
67	8 April	1249	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of TP 37 (1)
68	8 April	1611	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 68
69	8 April	1651	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
70	9 April	0640	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68
71	9 April	0709	Four persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 59 (2)
72	9 April	0920	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 264
73	9 April	1115	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 68
74	9 April	1552	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 264
75	9 April	1852	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
76	10 April	1111	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 34 (3)
77	10 April	1148	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
78	10 April	1157	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
79	10 April	1233	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 24 (1)
80	10 April	1331	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17 (1)
81	10 April	1358	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
82	10 April	1400	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of Shab'a
83	10 April	1430	Seven Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 72
84	11 April	1119	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
85	11 April	1203	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 56 (1)
86	11 April	1229	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP
87	11 April	1405	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
88	11 April	1528	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
89	11 April	1551	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 33 (B)
90	12 April	1021	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
91	12 April	1158	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 5 (1)
92	12 April	1352	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 18

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
93	12 April	1420	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 21
94	12 April	1653	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of TP 16
95	12 April	1718	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 24 (1)
96	13 April	0624	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
97	13 April	0730	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 60
98	13 April	0855	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 23 (1)
99	13 April	0940	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2 (2)
100	13 April	1153	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of M 6 (2)
101	13 April	1209	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP
102	13 April	1339	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 58 (1)
103	13 April	1416	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
104	13 April	1442	Six Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 30
105	13 April	1738	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of TP 37 (1)
106	14 April	0606	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
107	14 April	1116	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP
108	14 April	1130	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
109	15 April	0609	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
110	15 April	0920	Three persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of PCKP 1
111	15 April	1340	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 59 (2)
112	15 April	1440	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of BP 13 (2)
113	15 April	1804	Nine armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 61 (2)
114	16 April	0631	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
115	16 April	0838	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 59
116	16 April	1044	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 264
117	16 April	1327	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
118	16 April	1345	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
119	16 April	1505	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
120	16 April	1523	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
121	17 April	0929	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 65
122	17 April	1050	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
123	17 April	1050	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
124	17 April	1058	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
125	17 April	1110	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
126	17 April	1150	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 6
127	17 April	1220	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 15 (2)
128	17 April	1230	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AOP 6 Bastrah
129	17 April	1347	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
130	17 April	1402	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 2
131	17 April	1657	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
132	18 April	0615	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
133	18 April	1127	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
134	18 April	1155	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
135	18 April	1245	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 23 (1)
136	18 April	1318	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 383
137	18 April	1400	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 30
138	18 April	1557	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
139	18 April	1701	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP PROP
140	18 April	2252	One laser beam was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of ASTRA
141	19 April	0817	Three persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 58 (1)

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
142	19 April	1053	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 6 Bastrah
143	19 April	1108	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
144	19 April	1111	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
145	19 April	1120	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 35 (1)
146	19 April	1145	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 233
147	19 April	1157	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
148	19 April	1416	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
149	19 April	1450	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
150	20 April	0640	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
151	20 April	0800	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 60
152	20 April	1118	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 51 (1)
153	20 April	1156	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 19
154	20 April	1308	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
155	20 April	1405	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of TP 35 (1)
156	20 April	1510	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
157	20 April	1654	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
158	21 April	0633	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
159	21 April	0821	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 65
160	21 April	0936	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
161	21 April	1153	Six Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 32
162	22 April	0620	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 66 (1)
163	22 April	0637	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
164	22 April	0727	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 13
165	22 April	0950	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 64
166	22 April	1137	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
167	22 April	1139	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 5 CHEB
168	22 April	1151	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of TP 37 (2)
169	22 April	1532	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of TP 37
170	22 April	1538	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 6
171	22 April	2243	One laser beam was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of ASTRA
172	23 April	0721	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 8
173	23 April	0929	Six Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 61 (1)
174	23 April	1140	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
175	23 April	1436	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 33 (1)
176	24 April	0620	Four armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
177	24 April	0855	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 63 (1)
178	24 April	1205	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 7
179	24 April	1356	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 71
180	24 April	1434	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17 (1)
181	24 April	1535	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
182	24 April	1536	Five persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of TP 16
183	24 April	1549	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
184	25 April	0731	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 66
185	25 April	0932	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 5 CHEB
186	25 April	1040	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 264
187	25 April	1133	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
188	25 April	1133	Three persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
189	26 April	1220	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
190	26 April	1228	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13 (1)

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
191	26 April	1232	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
192	26 April	1250	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 60
193	26 April	2039	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of AOP 10
194	26 April	2112	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of AOP 10
195	27 April	0956	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
196	27 April	1050	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
197	27 April	1151	Six persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP OLD HELI
198	27 April	1237	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 2
199	28 April	0711	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 60
200	28 April	1134	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
201	28 April	1451	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 69 (1)
202	28 April	1639	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
203	29 April	0715	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 31
204	29 April	1145	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 30
205	29 April	1534	Five persons were observed climbing a Lebanese Armed Forces tower in the vicinity of AP 306
206	30 April	0604	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 68 (1)
207	30 April	0708	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AP 186
208	30 April	1015	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce and climbing a Lebanese Armed Forces tower in the vicinity of AP 264
209	30 April	1035	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 31
210	30 April	1055	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13 (1)
211	30 April	1157	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 32
212	30 April	1230	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 74 (B)
213	30 April	1347	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 15
214	30 April	1639	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
215	30 April	2147	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of AOP 10

United Nations S/2018/544

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 June 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 6 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 5 and 6 June 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex to the letter dated 6 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (5 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire: two in Aleppo Governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported two incidents of gunfire in Hama Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,827 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,597.76 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 287 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 82,099 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,513.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (6 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire: two in Aleppo Governorate and two in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: one in Kafr Batna, Damascus Governorate; and one in Hayyalin, Hama Governorate. In total, 890 food parcels were distributed. The weight of humanitarian cargo delivered was 3.8 tons.

In total, 1,829 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,601.56 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 376 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 82,475 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,513.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/545

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 6 June 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, presenting its position on the recommendations contained in the twenty-first report (S/2018/14/Rev.1) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Committee in accordance with paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution 2368 (2017).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the position paper could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

18-09361 (E) 140618

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Recommendations of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team contained in its twenty-first report

1. On 29 December 2017, the twenty-first report (S/2018/14/Rev.1) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team was submitted to the Committee pursuant to paragraph (a) of annex I to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017). A table of recommendations based on the report was also circulated to the Committee on 4 January 2018; the Committee deliberated on the recommendations in informal consultations on 12 January 2018. The Committee expresses its gratitude to the Monitoring Team for the exemplary work undertaken in the fulfilment of its mandate.

2. Since December 2005, when it established the practice, the Committee has responded to each of the reports submitted to it by the Monitoring Team and brought to the attention of the Security Council and the public the Committee's position on the recommendations contained in those reports.

Position of the Committee on the recommendations contained in the twenty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
Overview of the threat	
1. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the risk that ISIL-related individuals may attempt to get involved in legitimate businesses within their jurisdiction and encourage them, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness concerning this risk among relevant private sector stakeholders, encouraging them also to exercise increased vigilance and appropriate due diligence procedures to mitigate this risk.	The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the risk that ISIL-related individuals may attempt to get involved in legitimate businesses within their jurisdiction and encourage Member States, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness concerning this risk among relevant private sector stakeholders, encouraging them also to exercise increased vigilance and appropriate due diligence procedures to mitigate this risk.
2. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the risk of the misuse of aid and reconstruction funds and encouraging them, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness of this risk among the relevant organizations and companies involved in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the conflict zones, promoting heightened vigilance and partner vetting during the implementation phase of their projects.	The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the risk of the misuse of aid and reconstruction funds and encouraging them, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness of this risk among the relevant organizations and companies involved in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the conflict zones, promoting heightened vigilance and partner vetting during the implementation phase of their projects.

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
Impact assessment	
3. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as other Member States which are at risk of their cultural heritage being looted by terrorist organizations, highlighting the usefulness of catalogue registration numbers for the identification of stolen and looted items, encouraging them to compile lists of numbers from museum catalogues and exchange the relevant numbers of items that are known or suspected to have been looted and stolen with Member States bordering the conflict zones, as well as potential destination countries for stolen or looted antiquities and with relevant international organizations.	The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as other Member States[1] which are at risk of their cultural heritage being looted by terrorist organizations, highlighting the usefulness of catalogue registration numbers for the identification of stolen and looted items, encouraging them to compile lists of numbers from museum catalogues and exchange the relevant numbers of items that are known or suspected to have been looted and stolen with Member States bordering the conflict zones, as well as potential destination countries for stolen or looted antiquities and with relevant international organizations.
4. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the importance of controlling the international travel of returnees, relocators, foreign terrorist fighters and listed individuals, emphasizing the importance of biometric information for the identification of individuals, in particular individuals likely to travel with stolen, forged or altered travel documents, highlighting the urgency of the matter; and, in the light of resolution 2396 (2017), encourage again[2] those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to submit biometric data, in particular high-quality pictures and fingerprints of listed individuals, to the Committee and similar biometric data concerning foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).	The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the importance of controlling the international travel of returnees, relocators, foreign terrorist fighters and listed individuals, emphasizing the importance of biometric information for the identification of individuals, in particular individuals likely to travel with stolen, forged or altered travel documents, highlighting the urgency of the matter; and, in the light of resolution 2396 (2017), encourage those Member States that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to submit biometric data, in particular high-quality pictures and fingerprints of listed individuals, to the Committee and similar biometric data concerning foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators to INTERPOL.
5. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the risk that porous land and maritime borders present for the travel of listed individuals, foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators and encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to put in place appropriate border control management measures, such as bilateral or regional border control information sharing mechanisms, to address this issue.	The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the risk that porous land and maritime borders present for the travel of listed individuals, foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators and encourage those Member States that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to put in place appropriate border control management measures, such as bilateral or regional border control information sharing mechanisms, to address this issue.

[1] The Monitoring Team specified these Member States, to which a note verbale was dispatched following the approval by the Committee.

[2] S/2017/573, para. 91.

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
6. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to explore measures, such as creating a joint permanent team of financial intelligence unit and customs experts, to enhance the sharing of information and joint analyses, including on financial flows linked to international trade of goods, between customs agencies and financial intelligence units.	The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to explore measures, such as creating a joint permanent team of financial intelligence unit and customs experts, to enhance the sharing of information and joint analyses, including on financial flows linked to international trade of goods, between customs agencies and financial intelligence units.
7. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness among relevant weapon manufacturers of the risk of diversion of delivered arms and ammunitions to terrorist organizations and the implementation of detailed and in-depth know-your-customer procedures as a tool to mitigate this risk.	The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness among relevant weapon manufacturers of the risk of diversion of delivered arms and ammunitions to terrorist organizations and the implementation of detailed and in-depth know-your-customer procedures as a tool to mitigate this risk.
8. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to share information on materials used by terrorists with Programme Global Shield[3] in order to ensure that the global monitoring efforts of these materials can be updated accordingly. In addition, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so to participate in the programme.	The Chair agreed, on behalf of the Committee, to write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to share information on materials used by terrorists with Programme Global Shield in order to ensure that the global monitoring efforts of these materials can be updated accordingly, and encourage those Member States that have not yet done so to participate in the programme.
Sanctions measures (addressed to the Secretariat)	
9. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee instruct the Secretariat, to explore, in cooperation with the Monitoring Team, technical possibilities as to how biometric data, in particular pictures of listed individuals, could be made available via the sanctions list, specifically for implementers using a printed copy of the list to undertake screening.	The Committee agreed that the Chair would instruct the Secretariat to continue to explore, in cooperation with the Monitoring Team, technical possibilities as to how biometric data, in particular pictures of listed individuals, could be made available via the sanctions list, specifically for implementers using a printed copy of the list to undertake screening.

[3] Programme Global Shield was started in 2010 by the World Customs Organization, with the support of INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

United Nations A/72/889–S/2018/546

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 June 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda items 35 and 40

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the continued circulation by the Republic of Armenia of various papers on behalf of the puppet regime it has set up in the occupied territories of my country in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We resolutely reject such an apparent abuse by Armenia of its privilege of being a Member of the United Nations for misleading the international community by means of rude falsifications.

It is abundantly clear that, by propagating the unlawful regime, which is ultimately nothing other than the product of aggression, ethnic cleansing and racial discrimination, Armenia denies the facts, tries to evade responsibility and patently demonstrates its total disregard for the generally accepted norms and principles of international law and the position of the international community. Armenia's provocative actions also demonstrate how it is far from engaging in a constructive search for a political settlement of the conflict.

In its resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), the Security Council condemned the use of force against Azerbaijan and the bombardment and occupation of its territories and reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory. In response to Armenia's territorial claims and forcible actions, the Council reconfirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all the occupied territories.

Armenia's persistent denial of its responsibility for the aggression against Azerbaijan and unlawful occupation of and military presence in my country's territory has been effectively put to an end by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of

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Human Rights in its landmark judgment (Merits) of 16 June 2015 in the case of *Chiragov and others v. Armenia*. Having examined the evidence presented, the Court concluded that:

- "The Republic of Armenia, through its military presence and the provision of military equipment and expertise, has been significantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from an early date";
- "This military support has been — and continues to be — decisive for the conquest of and continued control over the territories in issue";
- The regime in those territories "survives by virtue of the military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia which, consequently, exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories".[1]

All papers Armenia circulates in the United Nations and other international organizations on behalf of the unlawful puppet regime are null and void ab initio and must be rejected and disregarded at the outset.

Armenia's confusing attempts to introduce Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory — the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied districts — by different names are equally invalid as they clearly violate international law, the Constitution and legislation of Azerbaijan and the principles and procedures for international standardization of geographical names established within the United Nations. Such attempts of Armenia are evidently aimed at distorting and falsifying the history and removing any signs of the Azerbaijani cultural and historical roots of the occupied territories.

We have repeatedly stated, and I want to stress again, that Armenia's annexationist and colonization policy has no chance of succeeding. The Nagorno-Karabakh region has always been and will remain an inalienable and inseparable part of Azerbaijan. Armenia will be compelled to withdraw from all the occupied territories of my country.

Yerevan must drop its futile attempts to mislead its own people and the wider international community, engage constructively in the conflict settlement process and comply with its international obligations. The sooner Armenia realizes the lack of any prospect of its dangerous and futureless political agenda and admits responsibility for the war it waged against Azerbaijan and its consequences, the sooner the conflict will be resolved and our countries and peoples will be able to benefit from long-awaited peace, stability and cooperation.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

[1] Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, *Chiragov and others v. Armenia*, Application No. 13216/05, Judgment (Merits), 16 June 2015, paras. 180, 183 and 185–186.

United Nations A/72/901–S/2018/547

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 June 2018

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 73
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 5 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Spain has the honour to transmit herewith the Chair's summary of the first annual retreat on international humanitarian law, on the theme "Protection of health care in armed conflict" (see annex),* which was organized by the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations at the Greentree Foundation on 25 April 2018.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 73, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jorge **Moragas**

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex to the letter dated 5 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

First annual retreat on international humanitarian law: Protection of health care in armed conflict

Chair's summary

On April 25th 2018, the Mission of Spain to the United Nations in New York organized the first annual Retreat on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for members of the Security Council at the Greentree Foundation. A total of 27 delegations participated in the Retreat, including twelve Security Council members and a cross-regional group of 15 other Member States.

The high level opening session was hosted by Spain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ildefonso Castro, and included opening remarks by the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mr. Peter Maurer.

The Retreat, that took place a few days before the second anniversary of UNSC Resolution 2286 (2016), was focused this year on the protection of healthcare in armed conflict.

UNSC Resolution 2286 reaffirms important IHL rules. It "strongly condemns acts of violence against the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities". It also "demands that all parties to armed conflicts fully comply" with their existing obligations under international law and take action to ensure respect for and protection of the delivery of healthcare in armed conflict.

The Retreat was divided into two main parts: the first one dedicated to taking stock on the (lack of) implementation of the IHL rules reaffirmed in UNSCR 2286; and the second one to discuss the way forward and possible options to improve the implementation of IHL in this area. Practitioners on the field, humanitarian and legal experts, academics, and representatives of Member States, of the UN Secretariat and civil society organizations participated in the Retreat.

The meeting was conducted under the Chatman House rules and was broken down into six complementary panels focused on: (1) the legal framework under IHL applicable to the wounded and sick and the medical mission; (2) the implementation of IHL rules reaffirmed in UNSCR 2286; (3) an overview of the existing non-judicial mechanisms for investigating attacks on healthcare; (4) national measures adopted to prevent and address attacks on healthcare; (5) a focus on victims and the impact of counterterrorism measures or IHL rules; and (6) possible options to improve the implementation of the IHL rules contained in UNSCR 2286.

The meeting brought together different inspiring ideas which ended up with a fruitful and enriching debate. Without being exhaustive, the following points were raised during the discussions:

1. IHL establishes that every wounded and sick should receive healthcare assistance according, only and exclusively, to their basic medical needs, following the principle of impartiality. In IHL, medical care is legitimate, required and impartial. On top of that the mere provision of medical care should never be considered a military activity contributing to hostilities.

2. Despite the existing IHL rules and UNSCR 2286 which strongly condemn the attacks on healthcare in armed conflict, available data show that those acts of violence against health-care providers have not ceased or substantially diminished. State parties to a conflict have the primary responsibility to investigate incidents that occur in the course of the conflict. There was general agreement that the existing fact-finding regimes and mechanisms have not, to date, unlocked their full potential. They could be put to more strategic use, taking into account their different purposes and procedures, which were discussed during the Retreat. Although there are a huge variety of non-judicial mechanisms that could investigate incidents of violence on healthcare in armed conflict, a special importance was given to the potential of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC), a mechanism which has been activated only once since it was established, primarily due to the requirement that concerned parties consent to the investigation.

3. Everybody agreed on the need to count on accurate data to develop better tools to prevent violence from happening and mitigating its consequences. In order to monitor such attacks, the World Health Organization launched in December 2017 a new collection data base, "the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care", which aims to formalize and strengthen a collaborative data collection mechanism. Data are of paramount importance but it's even more important to use them to prevent new incidents. A representative of the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition showed to the participants the preliminary results and conclusions of a report on attacks against healthcare which would be published a few weeks later, on May 21.

4. In order to perceive substantive changes regarding the number of incidents of violence against healthcare in armed conflict, efforts should be coming primarily from the States and parties to the conflict. Moreover, States must take preventive and proactive measures, both at the domestic and international level, to comply with IHL and SCR 2286. The Secretary-General's recommendations for the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 2286 include a menu of possible measures which would improve its implementation. Other initiatives such as the Health Care in Danger (HCiD) initiative, launched by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 2011 or the commitments included in political declarations such as the one launched by France in October 2017 also offer some guidance on how to translate political will into action.

5. In the domestic sphere, the speakers stressed the importance of incorporating the IHL obligations with regards to safeguarding access to, and the delivery of, healthcare into national legislation. The role that national parliaments can play, including through discussions of the matter within the International Parliamentary Union, was also stressed. It was underlined the need to strengthen military trainings and revise military doctrines to avoid the use of healthcare facilities for military purposes and adopt preventive and precautionary measures concerning ground movements, searches in health-care facilities, and military operations near health-care facilities. A special emphasis was given to the need of refraining from selling weapons to States or non-State actors which might be involved in incidents of violence against the wound and sick, healthcare facilities and personnel.

6. At the international level, States were urged to include compliance with IHL in their bilateral and multilateral contacts and to influence their partners and like-minded countries in order to help them comply with IHL. In this regard, States play a crucial role in increasing the political costs of such attacks by supporting international monitoring and inquiry mechanisms and taking diplomatic actions in order to strengthen accountability and end with impunity. Overall, there was a broad consensus about the necessity of developing a zero-tolerance policy among the International Community, so that there is a high political cost for a State or non-State actor to be linked or associated with this specific kind of attacks.

7. Another element discussed was the dilemmas and tensions created through the superposition of two applicable normative bodies (IHL and counterterrorism rules). They are evolving at two different speeds, with UNSC resolutions being the main source of the latter, with the consequence that sometimes there will be an outright conflict or contradiction with one another. Those who provide medical assistance must be protected from any possible criminal prosecution related to the performance of their duties. This is nowadays being challenged in a counterterrorism context where providing healthcare to non-state armed group, or even the mere fact of establishing dialogue with them in order to provide healthcare, is many times being associated to the perpetration of a criminal act (under the rationale behind Counterterrorism normative frameworks and measures). In this regard, a call was made to States to promote and implement domestic laws which would not criminalize such actions protected under the umbrella of IHL but also at the international level, and particularly in the UN counterterrorism context, specifically safeguard the impartiality of medical care.

8. Representatives shared a number of strategies and examples of how different States have developed efforts to implement IHL and UNSC Resolution 2286, two years after its adoption. These strategies ranged from concrete measures to adopt the domestic measures mentioned in point 5, in collaboration with international and local organizations, to the promotion of political declarations underscoring the importance of making efforts on compliance in this regard.

9. In the absence of a mechanism with a very specific mandate to investigate attacks against healthcare in armed conflicts anywhere where they may occur, one panelist pointed out the need to create a complementary panel that collects and systematizes the existing information, with a view to identify certain patterns and good practices that could be used in the area of data collection and reporting of these incidents.

10. The panelist identified three main functions to be performed by a panel of experts: (1) monitor and collect the available information to create a database that systemizes the patterns of incidents of violence against healthcare in armed conflicts. This would be made through a dialogue with the bodies which have been developing tracking systems, so as to avoid potential duplications and benefit from synergies; (2) an investigative function *stricto sensu*, as this panel would be in a position to assume the function of investigating specific incidents that could constitute attacks to healthcare amounting to breaches of IHL. This possibility would be done on a subsidiary basis only (after the assumption that other mechanisms are not able or willing to investigate for any reasons), and would require a specific activation decision through an ad hoc UNGA or UNSC Resolution. (3) Reparation, so that this panel of experts could give some orientation as regards to the need to prevent direct, structural long-term consequences in fragile healthcare systems in the territories that suffer them.

11. A few comments touched upon the need for this prospective panel to overcome requirements concerning the pre-requisite of obtaining access to the territory of the State where the incidents reported have taken place, something that leads to the question of the acceptance of the States concerned.

12. As a means of conclusion it was said that, with regard to protection of healthcare in conflict situations, there is a rather complete, comprehensive and dynamic normative framework, not deprived of tensions and dilemmas that need to be considered. The main question continues to be to what extent it is correctly implemented by parties to a conflict, and how UN member States can, domestically and internationally improve their efforts for full implementation. Certain gaps remain and need to be further developed: attention to victims; the preventive role of data

collection and independent and impartial monitoring and investigation; the search for accountability, both in legal terms but also in political terms; or the role that UN Missions can play in preventing attacks against healthcare.

13. Spain announced at the end of the Retreat that there would be another annual gathering in 2019, probably dedicated to a different area of IHL. The main goal of this initiative is bringing together UNSC members and a group of other interested countries to discuss more in depth and in a more informal setting, different areas of International Humanitarian Law.

May 18, 2018.

United Nations S/2018/548

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 June 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to inform you once again of the latest violent attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip by the Hamas terrorist organization and its affiliates against Israeli citizens.

Over the past two months, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, supported and funded by Iran, have launched over 100 missile and mortar attacks against Israeli civilian population centres, while continuing to instigate violent provocations along the security fence separating Gaza from Israel. These attacks include firing at Israeli security services, planting improvised explosive devices on the fence and throwing Molotov cocktails into Israeli territory.

Hamas has also used kite bombs to ignite over 250 fires in Israeli territory. These arson attacks have torched over 2,000 Israeli agricultural fields and have already caused over $1.4 million in damages.

In preparation for the stated intent of Hamas to provoke additional riots on Friday, 8 June 2018, the Israeli Air Force has dropped leaflets throughout Gaza, warning civilians against approaching the security fence, damaging it or carrying out acts of terror. Israel will not compromise on its security needs and will take all necessary steps in protection of our citizens and our sovereignty.

The State of Israel goes to great lengths to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza, with hundreds of tons of goods transferred from Israel to the Gaza Strip every day. The deterioration of the economic situation in the Gaza Strip is the sole responsibility of Hamas, as it continues to divert the funds intended to aid the population and exploit them for its terrorist operations.

Despite the reluctance of the Security Council to do so last Friday, I once again urge you to clearly and unequivocally condemn the dangerous actions of Hamas. In the interest of restoring calm to our region and preventing further violence, it is essential that you hold the terrorist organizations accountable.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-09404 (E) 120618

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United Nations A/72/892–S/2018/549

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
18 June 2018

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of March 2018.

I also wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued three notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force in March 2018.

It should be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

The above-mentioned actions of Turkey, which has illegally occupied the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974, are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In that respect, I would like to underline, once again, that there is only one legal authority in Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, as stipulated in various Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), in which the Council declared the establishment of the so-called "TRNC" as null and void.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to

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the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, I would like to urge Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to heed the calls of the international community and contribute to a meaningful resumption of the peace process, instead of focusing on undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 March	1007–1120	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
2 March	1052–1205	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1845–1920	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 March	1000–1627	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
4 March	1502–1604	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
5 March	0840–1035	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0853–0913	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1034–1047	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1206–1657	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1232–1247	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1335–1510	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1738–1810	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
6 March	0925–1240	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1110–1200	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1125–1209	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1125–1232	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1435–1555	One UH-1H Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2320–0255	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
7 March	1008–1030	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1346–1403	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1527–1730	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1603–1716	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1752–1925	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1827–1915	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
8 March	1010–1645	One Cougar and one Huey Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1341–1435	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
9 March	1014–1127	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1038–1057	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1049–1110	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1219–1244	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1245–1300	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1500–1523	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1635–1642	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 March	1006–1027	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1135–1153	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
12 March	0952–1026	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1105–1250	One UH-1H Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1345–1410	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1422–1630	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
13 March	0924–1110	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1354–1429	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
15 March	0945–1327	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1030–1136	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1328–1340	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1622–1741	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 March	0910–1058	One Huey and one Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1410–1608	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1420–1438	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1709–1722	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 March	1009–1230	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
19 March	1040–1254	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1150–1232	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1208–1237	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1208–1246	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1403–1520	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1415–1514	Four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1442–1516	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
20 March	1011–1120	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1510–1700	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1635–1710	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
21 March	1053–1205	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1310–1650	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1409–1513	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1547–1630	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 March	0812–0835	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0925–1002	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0959–1020	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1140–1345	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
23 March	1018–1222	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1203–1236	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1209–1234	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1406–1419	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1608–1722	One AS-532 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 March	0812–0904	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
25 March	1232–1340	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 March	0915–1004	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1317–1438	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1446–1452	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1502–1546	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1515–1521	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2002–2108	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 March	1919–2110	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
28 March	0959–1100	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1105–1124	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1417–1434	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
29 March	1015–1155	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1045–1306	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
30 March	1010–1234	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1 March	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
1 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
1–2 March	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
1–2 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
3–5 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
3–9 March	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
6 March	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
8–9 March	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
8–9 March	One F-504 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
9–10 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
10–12 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
10–13 March	One F-512 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

Dates	*Nature of violation*
12–14 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
13–16 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–15 March	One F-504 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–16 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–17 March	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
16–19 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
19–20 March	One F-504 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
19–20 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
20–21 March	One F-512 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
21–26 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
21–26 March	One F-244 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
22–31 March	One F-505 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
26 March	One F-505 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
26 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

Dates	*Nature of violation*
26–27 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
27–29 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
28–31 March	One A-580 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 23 February to 23 May 2018

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the period from 23 February to 23 May 2018, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most recently resolution 2394 (2017).

II. Situation in the area of operations and activities of the Force

2. During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic was maintained, albeit in a volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, and notwithstanding a number of violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces (Disengagement of Forces Agreement) of 1974, which are described below. The Syrian armed Forces and non-State armed opposition groups engaged in exchanges of heavy weapons fire in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side. Various armed groups, including the listed terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly the Nusrah Front) and the Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army, which pledged allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continued to exchange fire in the UNDOF area of operations. As underscored again by the Security Council in its resolution 2394 (2017), there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation.

3. In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line that it observes. All incidents of firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as the crossing of the ceasefire line by individuals, are violations of the Agreement. In its regular interaction with both sides, the leadership of UNDOF continued to call upon both parties to exercise restraint and prevent any miscalculations that might lead to an escalation of the situation. That was particularly the case when it responded to incidents of spillover and retaliatory fire.

4. Tensions escalated on 10 May in the areas of separation and limitation and across the ceasefire line. In the early hours of 10 May, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that rockets had been fired from the Syrian Arab Republic onto the Alpha side. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces fired across the ceasefire line in

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what they considered to be retaliation. On that day, UNDOF observed heavy explosive rounds from the Alpha side (Israeli-occupied Golan) fired across the ceasefire line, impacting in the area of separation. Heavy firing was observed from the Alpha side towards locations in the vicinity of the tri-village area of Jubbata al-Khashab, Ufaniyah and Turunjah: UNDOF personnel at United Nations observation post 73 observed an Israel Defense Forces main battle tank firing 12 rounds across the ceasefire line. The rounds impacted in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 71. UNDOF later observed two missiles impacting inside observation post 71. UNDOF personnel at observation post 73 also observed in excess of 10 missiles impacting in the tri-village area of Jubbata al-Khashab, Ufaniyah and Turunjah in the area of separation. UNDOF personnel saw the Israel Defense Forces fire a surface-to-air missile to intercept a missile that had been launched from the Bravo side. While UNDOF personnel observed and heard a considerable number of heavy explosions occurring in the area of separation, they were not in a position to verify all incidents or ascertain the points of origin and exact points of impact, owing to the mission's limited visibility of the area of separation and the ceasefire line. As a result of the intensity and frequency of explosions, United Nations personnel in UNDOF positions on the Bravo and Alpha sides took shelter in bunkers for a period of approximately five hours. Throughout the events, UNDOF maintained liaison with the Israel Defense Forces and Syrian authorities to ensure restraint and that the parties respected the Disengagement of Forces Agreement.

5. On 23 April, UNDOF personnel observed an artillery round impact west of the ceasefire line in the vicinity of Qahtaniyah. The point of impact was in proximity to United Nations observation post 51. When the artillery round was fired, an Israel Defense Forces patrol was present in the area of impact. UNDOF was not in a position to determine the point of origin of the artillery round. Israel Defense Forces soldiers fired single rifle shots into Qahtaniyah, in the area of separation. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that they had targeted a Syrian armed forces artillery position on the Bravo side, from which the fire had originated. UNDOF informed the Israel Defense Forces that it was ready to conduct an investigation into the spillover artillery fire incident. A response from the Israel Defense Forces is pending.

6. On a number of occasions, UNDOF personnel witnessed Israel Defense Forces soldiers firing gunshots across the ceasefire line. On 18 February, United Nations personnel at observation post 53 observed an Israel Defense Forces patrol firing single shots towards the area of separation. On 3 March, personnel at observation post 73 observed six Israel Defense Forces soldiers firing single shots into the area of separation. On 7 March, personnel at observation post 53 saw four Israel Defense Forces soldiers firing single rifle shots into the area of separation.

7. UNDOF continued to observe daily the crossing of the ceasefire line by unidentified individuals from the Bravo side to the Alpha side. On 17 April, during UNDOF mine-clearance operations on a route that leads to United Nations temporary observation posts on Mount Hermon in the area of separation, UNDOF observed boxes, suspected to be ammunition boxes, scattered on the ground in the vicinity of one of the temporary observation posts, about 2 km south-east of the United Nations position Hermon South.

8. Throughout the reporting period, UNDOF observed the continuous presence of unidentified individuals at the vacated United Nations observation post 71. The construction work on observation post 71 that had begun in December 2017 (see S/2018/244) had stopped by early May. However, following the events of 10 May, UNDOF observed unidentified individuals rebuilding and repairing observation post 71.

9. The level of transborder movements through Mount Hermon by unidentified individuals crossing between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic increased during the reporting period. On 23 March, 8 April and 6, 15 and 16 May, UNDOF personnel at United Nations Hermon Base position observed unidentified individuals, some of them armed, with mules moving between the Bravo side and Lebanon.

10. UNDOF continued to observe, on a daily basis, the crossing of the ceasefire line by unidentified individuals from the Bravo to the Alpha side. In the vicinity of United Nations observation post 54, in the southern part of the area of separation, groups of individuals from the Bravo side, ranging from 20 to 58 per day, were observed crossing the ceasefire line on foot and entering a building on the Alpha side. The Israel Defense Forces had previously informed UNDOF that a hospital located adjacent to their position was providing humanitarian assistance to local civilians. These groups of individuals were observed leaving the building, crossing the ceasefire line and moving back towards Mu'allaqah on the Bravo side.

11. In the context of the ongoing Syrian conflict, the northern part of the areas of separation and limitation generally saw low levels of fighting, with the noted escalation and intensity of kinetic activity occurring on 10 May. On 24 February, high-explosive fire was observed impacting in the vicinity of Jubbata al-Khashab in the area of separation. On 14 March, UNDOF personnel at observation post 73 observed 10 tracer rounds of ammunition impacting approximately 2 km south-east of their post. On 6 May, UNDOF observed 11 high-explosive rounds impacting in a location north-west of Jubbata al-Khashab in the area of separation.

12. Fighting between the Syrian armed forces, supported by pro-Government armed elements, and armed groups in the central parts of the areas of separation and limitation continued at low to medium levels of intensity. Throughout the reporting period, exchanges of fire occurred between the Syrian armed forces, supported by pro-Government armed elements in Khan Arnabah, Jaba and Ba'th, on one side, and other non-State armed groups in Samdaniyah al-Gharbiyah, Umm Batinah and New Hamidiyeh, on the other. On 23 February, UNDOF observed machine gun fire emanating from the vicinity of Umm Batinah. The point of impact of the machine gun fire could not be determined. On the same day, UNDOF observed high-explosive fire from an artillery piece originating from the vicinity of United Nations outpost 60A. On 23 February, UNDOF personnel observed a main battle tank that was stationary in the vicinity of Qunaytirah, in the area of separation, and subsequently heard explosions, which were followed by a movement of the tank in a southerly direction. On 25 March, UNDOF observed five heavy explosions impacting in the vicinity of New Hamidiyeh. UNDOF was not in a position to determine the point of origin of the explosions. On 6 May, UNDOF observed and heard in excess of 10 high-explosive rounds in the central part of the area of separation.

13. In the southern part of the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, which remain for the most part under the control of non-State armed groups, including those listed by the Security Council as terrorist groups, fighting continued between armed groups, especially the Khalid Ibn al-Waleed Army, on one side, and the Free Syrian Army and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, on the other. According to open sources, intermittent fighting continued around the area of Tasil in the area of limitation. United Nations personnel at observation post 54 and position 80 heard heavy explosions and bursts of heavy machine gun fire from the general direction of Tasil.

14. In the early hours of 19 April, United Nations personnel at observation post 54, located on the Alpha side east of the technical fence, observed seven unidentified individuals armed with AK-47 rifles approximately 450 metres south-east of the post. The individuals patrolled the area and stopped approximately 350 metres from the post, remaining in the area. After a period of time, the unidentified armed men

withdrew towards the southern part of the area of separation. The United Nations personnel at the post maintained a heightened level of safety and security alertness and monitored the situation.

15. Throughout the reporting period, the Syrian armed forces, supported by pro-Government armed elements, maintained positions in the area of separation, in particular in the vicinity of Ba'th and Khan Arnabah, as well as along the main road connecting Qunaytirah to Damascus.

16. The military violations on the Alpha side included approximately 200 reports of the presence of 155-mm artillery within 10 km of the ceasefire line, as well as Iron Dome systems and missile carriers within the 25 km zone of the area of limitation, which are considered unauthorized military equipment in the area of limitation pursuant to the terms of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement.

17. UNDOF protested all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that it observed to both parties, including the crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians from the Bravo side and the presence of unauthorized equipment and armed individuals in the area of separation, as well as firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line.

18. During the reporting period, UNDOF observed several locations where more than 485 tents and other structures appeared to have been set up for internally displaced persons in the area of separation and its vicinity. The number of people in the camps could not be ascertained and appeared to fluctuate. Owing to the closure of the established crossing point at Qunaytirah between the Alpha and Bravo sides since late August 2014, UNDOF remains unable to facilitate, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, humanitarian crossings, including for students, between the two sides.

19. Since its temporary relocation from a number of positions in September 2014, and pending its full return to the area of separation, UNDOF has continued to maintain visibility, albeit limited, of the area of separation and the ceasefire line from its positions on Mount Hermon, Camp Faouar, position 80, in the southern part of the area of separation, and position 22, on the Alpha side. UNDOF operations continued to be supported by United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers in Observer Group Golan, who are under the operational control of UNDOF and have maintained five fixed and four temporary observation posts along the ceasefire line, as well as four temporary observation posts on Mount Hermon. The focus of the activities of Observer Group Golan is on continuous static observation and situational awareness. The occupation by Observer Group Golan of observation posts on Mount Hermon was suspended on 3 December 2017 with the onset of winter and resumed on 30 April 2018.

20. Through Observer Group Golan, UNDOF continued to carry out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. Liaison officers from the Alpha side accompanied the inspection teams. Inspections in the area of limitation on the Bravo side remained suspended because of the security situation.

21. Engagement between UNDOF and the Israel Defense Forces continued to endeavour to address restrictions of movement and access to United Nations positions in the area of separation and to reduce delays and challenges experienced by United Nations personnel in crossing through the technical fence to observation posts and positions. The Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNDOF continued to remind the parties of their obligation to scrupulously abide by the terms of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, to ensure the safety and security of United

Nations personnel on the ground and to extend all cooperation to UNDOF in the fulfilment of the tasks under its mandate.

22. UNDOF, in consultation with both parties, continued to review the situation in the area of separation in order to assess whether the conditions on the ground permitted the return to vacated positions in the area of separation. In that regard, UNDOF conducted assessment visits and continuously monitored the security situation prevailing in the area of separation, mainly in the vicinity of United Nations observation posts 52, 56, 71 and 72, and positions 10, 16 and 32.

23. During the reporting period, UNDOF made progress towards the limited return to Bravo side operations, in line with the phased UNDOF plan (see S/2018/244). In phase 2 of the plan, UNDOF continues to develop the infrastructure and steadily improve the living conditions at Camp Faouar. The security and defence of the Camp have been continuously rehearsed, and all deployed elements have been integrated into a cohesive and effective component, with clear command and control mechanisms.

24. Since the resumption of patrolling on the Bravo side in February 2018, the UNDOF mechanized infantry company has conducted in excess of 30 protected patrols on the four designated routes in the northern and central parts of the areas of separation and limitation.

25. Phase 2 of the UNDOF plan also includes the refurbishment of facilities and security infrastructure of select observation posts in the area of separation, with a view to reoccupying observation posts 56, 71 and 72 in phase 3 of the incremental return to the Bravo side operations, conditions permitting. The UNDOF Joint Operations Centre completed its relocation to Camp Faouar, from which UNDOF operational activities are coordinated. The return of the UNDOF temporary headquarters from Ya'fur, Damascus, to Camp Faouar progressed significantly, with the office of the Force Commander now relocated to Camp Faouar. Observer Group Golan will not be deployed at observation posts on a permanent basis until such time as the security conditions permit and adequate accommodation and appropriate force protection measures are in place.

26. In accordance with the provisions of resolution 2394 (2017), and the UNDOF operational concept, UNDOF continued its efforts to deploy appropriate technology to ensure the safety and security of UNDOF personnel and equipment. A surveillance trailer remains deployed on the Alpha side at Camp Ziouani and position 22, while another is maintained at Camp Faouar. In addition, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations continued to engage with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Government of Israel regarding the "sense and warn" system, the technical specifications of which were shared with the parties in July 2017. The Syrian authorities have indicated that they will not agree to the deployment of the sense and warn system. The Israel Defense Forces have informally expressed that they have no objection to the deployment.

27. UNDOF continued to resupply its positions on Mount Hermon and Camp Faouar from Damascus. UNDOF convoys between Damascus and the United Nations positions were conducted almost daily, using main supply route 7 and the Salam highway with an UNDOF security escort, accompanied by a liaison officer from the office of the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate. UNDOF continuously monitors the situation and takes the necessary precautionary measures in planning and conducting its convoys along main supply route 7 and the Salam highway. UNDOF continued to conduct and update its contingency planning for the reinforcement and evacuation of United Nations positions and observation posts on both the Alpha and Bravo sides, as well as in Damascus. UNDOF, through its Force Reserve Company, conducted regular rehearsals, exercises and training for identified contingencies. The implementation of

risk mitigation measures, including force protection measures recommended in the military capability study of UNDOF, continued to be developed at observation posts, positions and operational bases at Camp Ziouani and Camp Faouar.

28. UNDOF continued to follow closely the developments related to the de-escalation zone in the south-western part of the Syrian Arab Republic, which had been established in accordance with an agreement reached on 9 July 2017 between Jordan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. Given the partial overlap between the de-escalation zone and the UNDOF area of operations, UNDOF maintained contact with relevant interlocutors to seek clarity with regard to arrangements envisaged under the agreement and their potential implications for UNDOF. The continuation of these contacts is particularly important in facilitating the implementation of the UNDOF mandate and in ensuring the freedom of movement of the Force as well as the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

29. As at 16 May 2018, UNDOF comprised 990 troops, including 36 women. Troops are currently deployed from Bhutan (2), Czechia (2), Fiji (300), Finland (2), Ghana (12), India (199), Ireland (138), Nepal (333) and the Netherlands (2). In addition, 70 military observers from UNTSO/Observer Group Golan, including 8 women, assisted UNDOF in carrying out its tasks.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

30. In its resolution 2394 (2017), the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement its resolution 338 (1973). It decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2018, and requested the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973). The search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), is addressed in my report on the situation in the Middle East (A/72/333), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 71/24 on the Syrian Golan and 71/25 on Jerusalem.

31. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties. The Syrian conflict further reduces the prospects for their resumption and for progress towards peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

IV. Financial aspects

32. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/306 of 30 June 2017, appropriated the amount of $57.7 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018.

33. As at 25 May 2018, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNDOF amounted to $19.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,129.6 million.

34. Reimbursement of troop costs has been made for the period up to 31 January 2018, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

V. Observations

35. I am deeply concerned by the continued military activity in the UNDOF area of operations. I reiterate my grave concern about the escalation of tensions between the parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, as shown by the events on 23 April and 10 May, in the area of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, and across the ceasefire line. Those developments jeopardize the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. I urge the parties to exercise maximum restraint at all times. I encourage members of the Security Council to support efforts to sensitize both parties and regional stakeholders to the risks of escalation and the need to preserve the long-standing ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

36. It remains critical that the parties maintain their liaison with UNDOF in the first instance, to prevent any escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line. For its part, the United Nations will maintain efforts to ensure that the long-standing ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to hold.

37. I remain gravely concerned by the security situation prevailing in the Syrian Arab Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and its implications for the stability of the wider region. The continued fighting on the Bravo side between the Syrian armed forces and armed groups, and between various armed groups, including listed terrorist groups, such as Jabhat Fath al-Sham, and ISIL affiliates, such as the Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army, in the UNDOF area of operations jeopardize the long-term ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and continue to significantly affect UNDOF mandate implementation and the UNDOF area of operations.

38. There should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF. I urge all parties to the Syrian conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operations, and to remove all military equipment and armed personnel from the area of separation.

39. I reiterate my call to both parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement regarding the requirement to maintain stability in the area. All military activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a risk to the ceasefire and to the local civilian population, in addition to the United Nations personnel on the ground. I call upon all parties to take the measures necessary to protect civilians and United Nations personnel, in line with their obligations under international law, in particular international humanitarian law.

40. The firing across the ceasefire line by the Israel Defense Forces has the potential to escalate tensions between the two sides. The continued presence of unauthorized weapons and equipment in the area of limitation on the Alpha side is also of concern.

41. As UNDOF continues to consolidate its presence at Camp Faouar and maintains its efforts to intensify its operations in the area of separation, it remains critical that the safety and security of United Nations personnel be assured. The circumstances under which the troops and military observers are operating remain complex and challenging, and require continued vigilance and risk mitigation measures. I renew my call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to fulfil its primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the Bravo side. I also renew my call on countries with influence to strongly and urgently convey to the armed groups in the UNDOF area of operations that it is imperative to cease any action in violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, including actions that jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel, and to enable UNDOF to carry out its mandate safely and securely.

42. Both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic have stated their continued commitment to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and support for the presence

of UNDOF in calling for a return to vacated positions in the area of separation. The full return of UNDOF to the area of separation remains a priority for the Force, conditions permitting. I count on the continued cooperation of both parties to facilitate the mission in advancing its planning for the incremental return to operations and positions in the area of separation and to ensure that the mission can implement its mandate. As a matter of priority, the deployment of technology and equipment necessary to enhance the UNDOF observation of the area of separation and the ceasefire line, while also augmenting UNDOF force protection, remains critical. In that regard, the support and cooperation of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic continue to be essential.

43. It is equally important that the Security Council continue to bring to bear its influence on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate in a safe and secure manner and is allowed to operate freely in accordance with the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. As long as the area of separation remains militarized and the presence of armed groups and/or Syrian armed forces continues, UNDOF will only fulfil its mandate in a limited manner. It is essential that this issue be addressed by the parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and in the wider framework of the Syrian political process. Furthermore, the reopening of the regular Qunaytirah crossing point would benefit the ability of UNDOF to implement its mandate. It is also necessary for UNDOF to continue to have at its disposal all means and resources necessary for it to return fully to the area of separation, conditions permitting.

44. The confidence and commitment of troop-contributing countries in UNDOF remains a key factor in the mission's ability to carry out its mandate. I continue to count on the support of troop-contributing countries as UNDOF proceeds with the implementation of its agreed plan for increased operations in the area of separation. I am grateful to the Governments of Bhutan, Czechia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, India, Ireland, Nepal and the Netherlands for their contributions, their commitment and their resolve. I am also thankful to the Member States contributing military observers to UNTSO.

45. I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential, and all the more so under the prevailing circumstances. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 December 2018. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

46. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Francis Vib-Sanziri, and the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership in UNDOF, who continue to perform the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council with efficiency and commitment under extremely challenging circumstances.

Map


LEBANON
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
JORDAN
NEPAL
FIJI (-)
INDIA (+)
INDIA - FIJI (-)
"A"
IRELAND
Camp Faoour
Camp Ziouani
Line "Alpha"
Line "Alpha 1"
Line "Bravo"
UNDOF Components
UNDOF HQ (Damascus)
OGG HQ (Yafour)
FIJI
INDIA
NEPAL (+)
NEPAL
IRELAND
MP
UNDOF
DEPLOYMENT
JUNE 2018
OGG observation post
UNDOF position
line "Alpha" or "Bravo"
Inter-battalion boundary
PALESTINE (BELT GRID)
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
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Letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 7 and 8 June 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex to the letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (7 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire: six in Aleppo Governorate and two in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported five incidents of gunfire: four in Idlib Governorate and one in Hama Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

The passage of a United Nations humanitarian convoy was assured to western Tafas in Dar'a Governorate. The total cargo weight was 97 tons.

In total, 1,829 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,601.56 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 202 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 82,677 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,513.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (8 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire: two in Aleppo Governorate and two in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: one in Izz al-Din, Homs Governorate; and one in Salihiyah, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. In total, 890 food parcels were distributed. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered was 3.8 tons.

In total, 1,831 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,605.36 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 376 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 83,125 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, two ceasefire agreements have been signed with Abtin and Qudaykhi in Aleppo Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,515.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.